By: Petra Minnerop
One of the core elements of the global response to climate change under the Paris Agreement is the parties’ nationally determined contributions (NDCs). The NDCs’ self-determined nature is often perceived as a major weakness of the treaty regime. This Article revisits the legal nature of NDCs and examines their legal position in international law. It demonstrates that NDCs can be situated within the infinite variety of unilateral acts. To capture the specific nature of NDCs, this Article introduces the category of prescribed qualified unilateral acts: unilateral acts that are prescribed by the treaty and subsequently qualified through treaty-based rules and procedures. The global stocktake, a new and central oversight mechanism created by the Paris Agreement, is at the center of this qualifying process. Within the inherently dynamic architecture of the Paris Agreement and primarily through the global stocktake, the submission cycle’s procedural rules and the content of NDCs are progressively qualified. This Article argues that parties have a distinct legal duty to translate directly the outcomes of the global stocktake into contributions that are suitable means for achieving the treaty’s objectives, based on the nature of NDCs as prescribed qualified unilateral acts in international law. The argument has significant implications for the next round of submissions after the global stocktake. At a more theoretical level, this Article shows how a treaty regime develops as an autopoietic system with iterative processes that incentivize legal developments in international (environmental) law.